RE: Name Constraints, was Re: [caops-wg] Re: ca signing policy file

["Cowles, Robert D." <rdc@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

The gridmapfile gives no clue as to CA or to VO.

Why do PKI *users* care about 2)? Unless you consider
the CA's to be "PKI users*.

BC

> Bob
> 
> I think 2) is the main reason used by PKI users in general.
> What are the design flaws in 1)?
> 
> thanks
> 
> David
> 
> 
> Cowles, Robert D. wrote:
> > My impression of why we had the constraints were:
> > 
> > (1) gridmapfile design flaw
> > 
> > (2) the CA's wanted some limitations so as to help
> >     divide up the people coming to them ... so that 
> >     one CA didn't have to issue certs for the whole
> >     world (since it's being done on pretty limited
> >     budgets).
> > 
> > BC 
> > 
> > 
> >>-----Original Message-----
> >>From: Frank Siebenlist [mailto:franks@mcs.anl.gov] 
> >>Sent: Wednesday, October 12, 2005 12:09 PM
> >>To: helm@fionn.es.net
> >>Cc: Cowles, Robert D.; David Chadwick; Von Welch; Tony J. 
> >>Genovese; CAOPS-WG; Olle Mulmo; Joni Hahkala; Jules Wolfrat; 
> >>Ron Trompert
> >>Subject: Re: Name Constraints, was Re: [caops-wg] Re: ca 
> >>signing policy file
> >>
> >>Sorry, but I have to disagree strongly.
> >>
> >>Having no name constraints and letting any CA issue any name 
> >>it wants, 
> >>puts all your trusted CAs on equal footing concerning the 
> names they 
> >>issue: any CA can overstep its policy boundaries concerning 
> >>the issued 
> >>names and you have no way to find out.
> >>
> >>Some form of enforced name constraining policy or localizing the 
> >>name-issuing to a CA is the only safeguard you have against 
> >>any rogue CA 
> >>among the zillions that may be present in your trusted CA-directory.
> >>
> >>Wasn't that the main reason that we have our current ca 
> >>signing policy 
> >>files in the first place?
> >>Did I miss anything?
> >>
> >>-Frank.
> >>
> >>
> >>Mike Helm wrote:
> >>
> >>>"Cowles, Robert D." writes:
> >>>  
> >>>
> >>>>that the middleware includes a check of the CA when it compares
> >>>>on DN, then what you say is correct.
> >>>>    
> >>>
> >>>This is one of the essential problems with this service that
> >>>has never been addressed as far as I know.  name constraints
> >>>"be" an incomplete barrier.
> >>>
> >>>BTW, we have found this omission _useful_ in our past.
> >>>
> >>>We switched from a test, development lab CA (DOE Science 
> >>
> >>Grid) to a production
> >>
> >>>quality CA (doegrids), and we used this property to ease 
> >>
> >>subscribers'
> >>
> >>>transition to the new CA.  Lesson?  Overlapping name spaces
> >>>might be useful!
> >>>
> >>>  
> >>
> >>-- 
> >>Frank Siebenlist               franks@mcs.anl.gov
> >>The Globus Alliance - Argonne National Laboratory
> >>
> >>
> > 
> > 
> 
> -- 
> 
> *****************************************************************
> David W. Chadwick, BSc PhD
> Professor of Information Systems Security
> The Computing Laboratory, University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NF
> Tel: +44 1227 82 3221
> Fax +44 1227 762 811
> Mobile: +44 77 96 44 7184
> Email: D.W.Chadwick@kent.ac.uk
> Home Page: http://www.cs.kent.ac.uk/people/staff/dwc8/index.html
> Research Web site: http://sec.cs.kent.ac.uk
> Entrust key validation string: MLJ9-DU5T-HV8J
> PGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5
> 
> *****************************************************************
>