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Re: Name Constraints, was Re: [caops-wg] Re: ca signing policy file



Bob

I think 2) is the main reason used by PKI users in general.
What are the design flaws in 1)?

thanks

David


Cowles, Robert D. wrote:
My impression of why we had the constraints were:

(1) gridmapfile design flaw

(2) the CA's wanted some limitations so as to help
divide up the people coming to them ... so that one CA didn't have to issue certs for the whole
world (since it's being done on pretty limited
budgets).

BC

-----Original Message-----
From: Frank Siebenlist [mailto:franks@mcs.anl.gov] Sent: Wednesday, October 12, 2005 12:09 PM
To: helm@fionn.es.net
Cc: Cowles, Robert D.; David Chadwick; Von Welch; Tony J. Genovese; CAOPS-WG; Olle Mulmo; Joni Hahkala; Jules Wolfrat; Ron Trompert
Subject: Re: Name Constraints, was Re: [caops-wg] Re: ca signing policy file

Sorry, but I have to disagree strongly.

Having no name constraints and letting any CA issue any name it wants, puts all your trusted CAs on equal footing concerning the names they issue: any CA can overstep its policy boundaries concerning the issued names and you have no way to find out.

Some form of enforced name constraining policy or localizing the name-issuing to a CA is the only safeguard you have against any rogue CA among the zillions that may be present in your trusted CA-directory.

Wasn't that the main reason that we have our current ca signing policy files in the first place?
Did I miss anything?

-Frank.


Mike Helm wrote:

"Cowles, Robert D." writes:

that the middleware includes a check of the CA when it compares
on DN, then what you say is correct.
This is one of the essential problems with this service that
has never been addressed as far as I know. name constraints
"be" an incomplete barrier.

BTW, we have found this omission _useful_ in our past.

We switched from a test, development lab CA (DOE Science
Grid) to a production

quality CA (doegrids), and we used this property to ease
subscribers'

transition to the new CA. Lesson? Overlapping name spaces
might be useful!

--
Frank Siebenlist               franks@mcs.anl.gov
The Globus Alliance - Argonne National Laboratory



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