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[caops-wg] OCSP document - proxies and delta CRLs
- To: caops-wg@xxxxxxx
- Subject: [caops-wg] OCSP document - proxies and delta CRLs
- From: Olle Mulmo <mulmo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 31 May 2005 13:35:21 +0200
- Delivered-to: grdfm-caops-wg-outgoing@mailbouncer.mcs.anl.gov
- Delivered-to: grdfm-caops-wg@mailbouncer.mcs.anl.gov
- Sender: owner-caops-wg@xxxxxxx
* Page 7, section 5.5: the paragraph suggesting the use of Delta CRLs
to obtain Proxy Certificate´s status has been deleted ("Another option
refers to using OCSP in a Push Operation Mode as mentioned in section
6.3, where relying parties SHOULD obtain revocation information
through its OCSP service provider as soon as it is updated by the
corresponding CA through Delta-CRLs"). Only as a way to let the reader
know about this possibility, don't you think that it is worth to keep?
For an EE to "register" a proxy certificate with an OCSP responder, we
will require a protocol, and/or extensions to an existing protocol. Why
cannot the "disabling" of a previously registered proxy cert use the
same channel?
The two operations are about making changes to the responder's
revocation database, so for me it makes sense to have them tightly
coupled.
I don't rule out the use of Delta CRLs, but a Delta must be built
relative to a full CRL, which must be referenced. What is the full CRL
of an EE? In addition, support would have to be added in the responder
validation routines to allow EE (or proxies thereof?) certs to sign
CRLs. Overall, this smells too much of a hack to me.
/Olle